I Led the Air Attack on Pearl Harbor By Captain Mitsuo Fuchida, former IJN
Edited by Roger Pineau  September 1952
NAVAL PROCEEDINGS  Vol. 78/9/595

In September 1941, I was transfered​

Captain Fuchida

from the staff of the Third Carrier Division to aircraft carrier Akagi, a position I had left just one year earlier. Shortly after joining my old comrades in Akagi, I was given additional duty as commander of all air groups of the First Air Fleet. This was an assignment beyond all my dreams. I felt that some thing big must be afoot.  
It was at Kagoshima on the southern tip of Kyushu that I first learned the magnitude of events in store for me. My good friend Commander Genda, air operations officer on the staff of the First Air Fleet, came to see me at the air base and said, "Now don't be alarmed, Fuchida, but we want you to lead our air force in the event that we attack Pearl Harbor!"

Don't be alarmed? It was all I could do to catch my breath, and almost before I had done so we were on our way out to board Akagi, then anchored in Ariake Bay, for a conference with First Air Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, and his staff, including Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka.

The more I heard about the plan the more astonishing it seemed. Genda kept urging that torpedoes be used against ships in Pearl Harbor; a feat that seemed next to impossible in view of the water depth of only twelve meters, and the harbor being not more than five hundred meters in width. When I pointed this out, Genda merely grew more aggressive, insisting that if we could launch torpedoes, they would not be expected, it would add to the surprise of the attack and multiply their effectiveness. This line of argument won me over, and, despite the technical difficulties that would have to be overcome, I agreed to include torpedoes in our attack plans.
​
Shallow-water torpedo launching was not the only difficult problem I had to cope with. From ordinary fleet practice we had to shift our energies to specific training for this all-important mission calling for vast and intensive preparations; and, what is more, everything had to be done in haste. It was already late September, and the attack plan called for execution in December!
There was no time to lose. Our fliers had to work at the hardest kind of training. An added handicap to our efforts lay in the fact that, for security reasons, the pilots could not be told about the plans. Our progress was slow, especially with the problem of launching torpedoes in shallow water. Against my will I had to demand more and more of every man, yet none complained. They seemed to sense the intensification of the international situation and gave of themselves unquestioningly.

It was not until early November that the torpedo problem was finally solved by fixing additional fins to the torpedoes, and then my greatest worry was over. I was indeed proud of my men and felt honored to be their commander and participate in this great attack.
In mid-November First Air Fleet planes were taken on board their respective carriers which then headed for the Kuriles, traveling singly and taking separate courses to avoid attention. By the 22nd the entire force had assembled in isolated Tankan Bay on Etorofu second island from the southern end of the chain extending northeast from Hokkaido. This force consisted of carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku, battleships Hiei, Kirishima; heavy cruisers Tone, Chikuma; light cruiser Abukuma; destroyers Urakaze, Isokaze, Tanikaze, Hamakaze. Kazumi, Arare, Kagero, Shiranuhi, Akigumo; submarines 1-19,1-21,1-23; and tankers Kyokuto Maru, Kenyo Maru, Kokuyo Maru, Shinkoku Maru, Akebono Maru, Toho Maru, Toei Maru, and Nihon Maru

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The following order was issued from Tokyo on the day that Akagi sailed into Tankan Bay:

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Order No.5
21 November 1941

To: Commander in Chief Combined Fleet Isoroku Yamamoto
Via: Chief of Naval General Staff Osami Nagano By Imperial Order

1. Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will, at an appropriate time, dispatch to stand-by points necessary forces for execution of operations.

2. Commander in Chief Combined Fleet is empowered to use force in self defense in case his fleet is challenged by American, British or Dutch forces during the process of carrying out military preparations.

3. Detailed instructions will be given by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
​_____________________________________________________________________

The designated stand-by point was 42°N 170°W over a thousand miles to the north of the Hawaiian Island chain.
At 0600 on the dark and cloudy morning of 26 November our 28-ship task force weighed anchor and sailed out into the waters of the North Pacific Ocean. The sortie was cloaked in complete secrecy. A patrol boat guarding the bay entrance flashed a message, "Good luck on your mission." But even that boat was unaware of our assignment. Akagi signalled, "Thanks," and passed by, her ensign fluttering in the morning breeze. It would not be long before this ensign was replaced by a combat flag.
But this did not mean that the arrow had already gone from the bow. "In case negotiations with the U. S. reach a successful conclusion," Nagumo had been instructed, "the task force will put about immediately and return to the homeland." Unaware of this, however, the crews shouted "Banzai!" as they took what might be their last look at Japan.

On Akagi's bridge Commander Gishiro Miura, the navigation officer, was concentrating all his energies on control of the ship. Whether we reached the scheduled launching point successfully rested entirely upon his shoulders. So tense was his appearance that it made us feel he was a completely different man. His usual jovial attitude had disappeared. He now wore shoes instead of his usual slippers, and he was neatly dressed, a decided change from his customary dirty, worn-out uniform. Captain Hasegawa, the skipper of the ship, stood beside him. Sitting at the flight desk control post under the bridge, I watched the gradually receding mountains of the Kuriles.

Young boys of the flying crews were boiling over with fighting spirit. Hard nights and days of training had been followed by hasty preparations, and now the sortie, which meant that they were going to war.
I felt their keen enthusiasm and was reassured. Still I could not help doubting whether Japan had the proper confidence for carrying out a war. At the same time, however, I fully realized my duty as a warrior to fight and win victory for my country.

Personally I was opposed to the operational policy. The idea of an attack on Pearl harbor was a good one, but I thought the plan should have called for complete destruction of the United States Pacific Fleet at the outset, followed by an invasion of the Hawaiian Islands to push America entirely out of the Central Pacific. The plan covered expansion to the south—the Philippines, Malaya, Hongkong, Guam, and other such vulnerable positions. It was my opinion that if Pacific operations to the east proved successful, there would be no need for military operations in the south.

Since the United States was the main foe, I could not understand why operations were not aimed directly toward the east. Admiral Yamamoto was quoted as having said that he had no confidence in the outcome of war after the first year. Why then, did he not press and press the enemy in the first year to force an early conclusion to the war? Anyway, the immediate mission was to strike a telling blow, and my assignment carried a grave responsibility. At the time I thought, "Who could be luckier than I?"

My thoughts continued: What if the Fleet is not in Pearl Harbor? In such a case we would seek out the enemy en route to the attack. If we should meet the enemy tomorrow would Nagumo withdraw? No, we should attack and destroy him, I thought, and if the Admiral showed any hesitation, I would volunteer my views on these matters.
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Such thoughts came one after another, but one remained uppermost. I was determined to do my utmost for victory.
In the meantime, the fleet had assumed formation. The carriers sailed in parallel columns of three followed by the tankers. On the outside two battleships and two heavy cruisers took positions, the whole group encircled by a screen of the light cruiser and destroyers. The submarines patrolled about 200 miles ahead of our force. The course was direct to the stand-by point, speed was fourteen knots. The first fueling at sea was carried out five days after our sortie, on 30 November.
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